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STARTING SALARY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN: ORGANIZATION-
LEVEL FINDINGS AND AN ANALYSIS OF CURREN'I'POLICY OPTIONS
This study examined the starting salaries paid by over 250
employers to 2,800 university graduates. Of the overall female-
male salary difference of $4,396, the majority, or $3,175 (72%),
occurred between employers; $1,221 (28%) occurred within employers.
One policy implication is that within-organization policies such as
pay equity could address up to $1,221 (28%) of the female-male pay
difference. Although adjustment for qualifications such as degree
level, grade point average, and college major reduced the pay
difference between women and men, our findings indicate that, on
average, the same employer pays graduating women 3.5% to 5.8% less
than graduating men with similar qualifications.
The authors would like to thank Tom Devlin, Rob Cushing, Michael
Matier and the Office of Institutional Planning and Research at
Cornell University for access to and assistance with the data, the
President's Council of Cornell Women for financial support, and
Donna Blancero, Donna Rothstein, and Pamela Tolbert for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Hartmann, 1981), few have used organization-level data. And
The female-male earnings ratio stands at 73% for managerial
and professional specialty jobs (Bureau of National Affairs,
1992) . In economic theory, the market forces of supply and
demand determine salaries, and hence, should explain gender-
related earnings differences. However, it has become
increasingly apparent to economists, sociologists, and other
students of pay determination that product market, labor market
and other influences on pay should be studied and understood in
the context of specific organizations (employers), for two
reasons: 1) the pay-setting process occurs within organizations,
and 2) similar organizations can differ significantly in their
pay practices (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Groshen, 1990).
Additionally, organization-level information is essential to
estimate the likely impact of pay policies designed to reduce
within-employer pay differentials (Groshen, 1990; Johnson &
Solon, 1986).
However, despite the fact that numerous studies have
examined sources of earnings differences between women and men
{for reviews, see Blau & Ferber, 1992; Cain, 1986; Treiman &
although there has been research on discrimination in hiring
decisions (e.g., Olian, Schwab, & Haberfeld, 1988) and using
single employers (e.g., Gerhart, 1990), two basic questions
remain unanswered. First, to what extent do women and men with
the same qualifications hired by the same employers earn the same
starting salaries? Second, if similarly qualified women and men
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hired by the same organization are paid aifferently, what is the
magnitude of this within-organization differential relative to
the gender differentials in pay that may exist between
organizations?
We would like to identify pay differences that remain after
adjusting for qualifications, and we control qualifications in a
number of ways. The sample consists of graduates of a single
university that has highly competitive admissions standards,
which should reduce variance in academic ability. For example,
the class of 1995 at this institution had a combined SAT score
average of approximately 1300, and 84% of them were in the top
10% of their high school class. We also control for degree level
and college grade point average. Finally, we adjust for
differences in college major, which although it has been found to
significantly influence earnings (Dayrnont & Andrisani, 1984;
Gerhart, 1990), it is often not included in studies of pay
determination.
Our measures of ability, which control for differences in
qualifications between women and men, combined with organization-
level data should allow for more accurate determination of the
factors behind starting salary differences, and consequently,
more accurate policy recommendations. We consider several
policies, including pay equity (comparable worth), defined as
equal pay for work of equal value; equal pay as defined under the
Equal Pay Act of 1963; equal employment opportunity (EEO)
policies, or nondiscrimination in employment decisions;
4
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affirmative action policies, defined as employment goals that
assist women and minorities underrepresented in certain jobs,
occupations, and employers, with a focus on both job assignment
and hiring practices; and equal education efforts, including
equal access to and opportunity in education.
We build upon several recent studies of female-male pay
differences. In the absence of employer-level data, Johnson and
Solon (J&S) (1986) used industry-level data to conclude that a
comparable worth policy would eliminate 8%-20% of women's pay
disadvantage. Moreover, the authors suggest that they may have
actually overstated the policy's efficacy because they used
industry rather than employer-level data. Data at the industry
level do not capture differences between employers within the
same industry. And comparable worth policies, which focus on
within-employer differences, would not address between-employer
differences within an industry.
Groshen (1990) was able to use establishment-level data to
estimate that 40%-74% of negative returns to percent female occur
within establishments, and thus, a comparable worth policy would
have a much greater impact on female-male pay differences than
suggested by the J&S research. In our study, we build upon
Groshen's (1990) application of policy to earnings differentials.
However, Groshen's study did not control for human capital and
examined only 5 industries~ as opposed to J&S's economy-wide
sample, and our 65 industries.
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This study adds to the literature on female-male earnings
differences in several ways. First, the study aims to reconcile
the conflicting findings and interpretations of the J&S and
Groshen studies, by measuring human capital type and quality,
neither of which are controlled for in those studies. Second,
using controls for both employer and industry we can evaluate
J&S's suggestion that employer-level data more finely
distinguish, and therefore, provide lower estimates of within-
organization pay differences.
Policy options and their likelihood of implementation change
over time. Pay equity seeks to eliminate pay differences between
women and men that stem from women working in occupations that
are paid less because they are dominated by women. Although our
study's results should have implications for pay equity policies,
its impact should be much broader because it will yield estimates
of the relative size of between- and within-employer differences.
Many policies focus on only one or the other component.
Because Gerhart (1990) and Olson et ale (1987) found that
starting salary shortfalls for women explained a large portion of
career female-male earnings differences, and because starting,
salaries do not contain the confounding influences of aft~r-hire
factors, this study focuses on starting salary differences
between women and men. Moreover, a good deal of work suggests
that because decisions about new hires take place in the context
of relatively poor information and high ambiguity, the risk of
discrimination may be higher than in many other employment
6
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university, and includes academic and employment data. The
decisions (Nieva & Gutek, 1980; Powell, 1993; Tosi & Einbender,
1985) . We examine starting salaries of women and men using data
on more than 65 industries, and over 250 private and public
sector employers.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
We pose three research questions in this study:
1) What factors influence the starting salaries of college
graduates? What portion of earnings remains unexplained after
controlling for supply- and demand-side factors?
2) How much of the female-male disparity in the starting salaries
occurs within versus between organizations?
3) What are the implications of these results regarding the
ability of public policies to remedy differences between female
and male starting salaries?
METHOD
Sample
The sample consists of 2~800 graduates of a large
subjects, 1,289 (46%) of whom are women, graduated between 1985
and 1988, and gained employment at more than 250 organizations.
The data are from an annual placement survey administered .by the
university, and supplemented by academic data from the university
registrar's office. The average response rate for the survey was
80%. See Table 1 for additional descriptive information on the
sample.
--------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
--------------------------------
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The final sample consisted of full-time workers who were
u.s. citizens employed by civilian employers. Excluded
observations included those with no salary information, foreign
individuals, volunteer workers, professional interns, part-time
and self-employed workers, and those in the military. Also,
those working for employers hiring 2 or less graduates were
excluded.
Excluded observations were examined for evidence of
selection bias. The largest excluded group, those with no salary
data, consisted in part of graduate students (38%) and those
still seeking employment (11%). The numbers of women and men
excluded for lack of salary data were in line with their
proportions in the original sample -~ 45% for women and 55% for
men. The other major exclusion from the original data were those
who worked for employers hiring 2 or fewer graduates. We used
this sample restriction because a major focus of our study is to
estimate within- versus between-employer pay differences. Thus,
at least two observations, and preferably more in order to
enhance precision, are required for each employer. Visual
inspection of employers hiring less than this number indicated
that they were smaller employers. Since 55% of these exclusions
were women, then women may be working for smaller employers, and
exclusion of this group could underestimate between-organization
differences in pay between women and men. Also, women may work
. for these smaller employers because they cannot obtain positions
with larger, better-paying organizations. On the other hand,
8
and men through an examination of starting salaries. The use of
smaller employers may offer better career opportunities in
today's climate of employer downsizing. It is difficult to
determine the impact of the sample selection in this case.'
Overall, by studying the starting salaries of recent labor
force entrants, the sample is less likely to suffer from the
selection bias problems of career earnings studies. If women
experience starting salary shortfalls and these explain a
significant portion of career earnings differences, women may be
less likely to remain with employers that pay them less or to
remain in the labor force in general.
Measures
In this study we explore earnings differences between women
starting salaries avoids the potentially confounding influences
of after-hire factors on pay, such as performance appraisal
ratings and employer-provided training. These after-hire
measures significantly influence earnings, but may reflect
employer discrimination (Gerhart, 1990). Also, the relationship
between human capital and starting salaries may be more direct
than with career earnings because graduates' recently acquired
human capital will have undergone minimal depreciation.
Because the primary human capital sources of female-male pay
differences include level and quality of education (Becker, 1971;
Mincer, 1974), we distinguish masters and bachelors degree
recipients by a dummy variable for degree level; human capital
quality is measured by grade point average, and by examining
9
graduates of a single university to minimize variation in
educational quality.
College major serves both as a measure of human capital and
a measure of labor market conditions, and has been found to be a
significant predictor of salaries (Daymont & Andrisani, 1984;
Gerhart, 1990). We chose major instead of occupation because
major better reflects student choices than does occupation, which
is a function of both student and employer choices. Major is
measured with 76 dummy variables. We were unable to measure
another source of gender-related pay differences, labor market
experience (Mincer & Polachek, 1974; Olson, Frieze, & Good,
1987), but expect variation of this measure to be minimized by
the fact that over 80% of the sample consists of
2
undergraduates.
Women work in separate industries/sectors (Blau, 1977;
Goldin, 1990), establishments (Groshen, 1990), occupations (Blau,
1977; Groshen, 1990), jOb levels (Bielby & Baron, 1986), and jOb-
cells (occupation within employer) (Blau, 1977; Bielby & Baron,
1986; Groshen, 1990), than do men. significant segregation by or
separation into these related structural components may translate
into earnings differences between women and men (Buckley, 1971;
Beller, 1982).
We use employer and industry dummy variables to capture
market influences specific to particular employers and
industries. Industry indi~ator variables are represented by 3-
digit SIC codes, except where there were not at least two
10
(3)
employers per industry, in which cases industries were aggregated
to 2-digit SIC codes. Employer indicator variables were coded
with unique Duns codes according to Dun & Bradstreet directories
(1985-1988); hence, subsidiaries with unique Duns codes were
treated as separate employers, but divisions within organizations
were treated as one employer. Finally, we hold constant the year
of graduation and ethnicity using dummy variables.
Analyses
The first two research questions required different
approaches. To determine what factors influence the starting
salaries of college graduates (Research Question 1), a series of
regression equations were run separately by gender, in which
dummy variables for department major, and industry or employer,
were added to successive equations to examine how the results
changed as progressively less exogenous variables were added
(Blinder, 1973). The equations are presented below:
In (Sj) = HUMAN CAPITAL B, + DATE B2 + J1. (1)
In (Si) = HUMAN CAPITAL B, + DATE B2
(2)
MAJOR B3 + J1.
In(Si) = HUMAN CAPITAL B, + DATE B2
MAJOR B3 + INDUSTRY B4 + J1.
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In (S;) = HUMAN CAPITAL B, + DATE B2
(4)
MAJOR B3 + EMPWYER Bs + J1.
where Si is the starting salary of the i-th worker, HUMAN CAPITAL
is a vector of human capital characteristics, DATE represents a
vector of graduation date dummy variables, MAJOR is a vector of
college major dummy variables, EMPLOYER a vector of employer
dummies, and INDUSTRY a vector of industry dummy variables.3
The ~s represent vectors of coefficients and J1.is a disturbance
term.
Then using the regression results, gender differences in pay
were decomposed into two components (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca,
1973): 1) differences in mean levels of endowments, and 2)
differences in coefficients for these endowments; i.e. returns
paid by employers. In a salary decomposition, female and male
salaries are modeled using separate equations (all salary data
are in natural log form):
Sf = Bf Xf (5)
S = B Xin m m (6)
And the average salary difference between women and men is as
follows:
Sm - Sf = Bm (Xm - Xf) + Xf (Bm - Bf) (7)
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In (5i) = X B, + GENDER
B2' + J1. (9)
This overall salary difference was decomposed into the portions
due to mean differences in endowments and differences in
coefficients (returns) by dividing each side of the previous
equation by the salary difference between women and men:
1 = Bm (Xm - Xf) / Sm - Sf (MEAN)
(8)
+ Xf (Bm - Bf) / Sm - Sf (COEFFICIENT) , where
S=starting salary
f=female
m=male
B=coefficient
X=endowments, productivity traits
To determine the portions of the female-male pay difference
occurring between and within organizations (Research Question
Two), regressions were performed with data on women and men in a
single equation that included a gender variable. Employer,
industry, or employer/industry dummy variables were added
subsequently and changes were calculated in the gender
coefficient:
In (5) = X B, + GENDER B22 + EMPLOYER B3 + J1. (10)
In(Si) = X B, + GENDER B23 + INDUSTRY B3 + J1. (11)
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In (S;) =X B, + GENDER B24 + EMPWYER B3 + INDUSTRY B4 + J..L (12)
where X included some or all of the following variables: GPA,
DEGREE LEVEL, ETHNICITY, GRADUATION DATE, or COLLEGE MAJOR. A
negative coefficient on gender,
~2' (women=l, men=O), in (9),
would indicate that women were paid less than men. The addition
of the employer variable (10) creates a new gender coefficient
~22' which represents the portion of the earnings difference
occurring within employers. The difference bet-ween
~2' and ~22
yields the portion of the earnings difference occurring between
employers. The X vector of control variables was specified three
different ways in Models A, B, and C :
A) ETHNICITY, GRADUATION DATE
B) ETHNICITY, GRADUATION DATE, DEGREE LEVEL, GPA
C) ETHNICITY, GRADUATION DATE, DEGREE LEVEL, GPA, MAJOR
RESULTS
Research Question One
What factors influence the starting salaries of college
graduates, and what portion of earnings remains unexplained after
controlling for supply- and demand-side factors? Regression
results are presented in Table 2. Note that the presence ,or
absence of department major, industry, and employer dummy
variables in the models is indicated by a "YES" or "NO",
respectively. Because all measures are dummy variables, results
are interpreted in terms of the missing category. For example,
14
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graduation date coefficients are estimated in relation to the
reference year, 1988. Wage decompositions, earnings ratios, and
discrimination estimates are presented in Table 3.
~---------------
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here
--------------------------------
The addition of college major in Model 2 (Table 2) improved
the explanatory power of the model over that of Model 1, with the
adjusted R-squared values increasing from .078 to .511 for women
and from .180 to .557 for men. Also, the fit of the models
increased with the additions of the industry (Model 3) and
employer (Model 4) variables, although the employer dummy
variable clearly explained more of the variance in starting
salaries.
As expected, in all models bachelors degree recipients
received lower returns than did those holding masters degrees,
ranging from 17% less for males in Models 2 and 4 to 28% less for
males in Modell (Table 2). Men with high grade point averages
received significantly more than males with low grade point
averages in Models 1 through 3, as did females with high grade
point averages in Model 3.
The mean and coefficient columns of Table 3 for each model
sum to a total of one, which represents the pay difference
between women and men. positive figures in either column
represent positive contributions to the earnings difference.
Conversely, negative figur€s represent factors that narrow the
earnings difference. Specifically, a positive figure in the
15
"mean" column signifies that women possess more low-paying
characteristics and/or that men possess more high-paying
characteristics. A positive figure in the "coefficient" column
reflects lower returns that women receive for endowments, whether
they possess more or less of the endowments compared to men. For
measures such as major, which are operationalized through a
number of dummy variables, the figures in the table represent
sums of the mean and coefficient calculations for all dummy
variables for that measure. The calculations of means and
coefficients have policy implications in that differences in
endowments may support pOlicies such as equal education efforts,
while differences in coefficients may call for equal opportunity,
affirmative action, or employer pay policies such as pay equity.
As presented in Table 3, Model 2, college major contributed
significantly to the earnings difference because women and men
major in differentially paying majors (mean). However, given the
same major, women received higher returns than their male
counterparts (coefficient). Women also obtained higher returns
for the same major within industry (Model 3) and within employer
(Model 4).
The decomposition results also highlight the fact that
industry and employer lead to differential findings. The
positive mean and coefficient for industry (Table 3, Model 3)
indicated that women worked in lower-paying industries than did
men (mean) but that within the same industry women received a
substantial salary penalty (industry coefficient). This is in
16
"Ar''', the formulas for which are presented beneath Table 3. The
contrast to Model 4 (Table 3) where within the same employers,
women appeared to be at a slight advantage in terms of pay
(employer coefficient). In addition, the positive mean value for
employer in Model 4 indicated that on average, women worked for
lower-paying employers than did men. Overall, women received
less pay both within industries (Model 3 total coefficient) and
employers (Model 4 total coefficient).
It should be noted that the overall coefficients for both
Models 3 and 4 remained positive,demonstrating that women still
receive negative returns within industries or employers as
compared to men.
As displayed in Table 3, Models 2 through 4, the degree
level distribution for women as compared to men resulted in lower
female salaries because fewer women possess masters degrees
(mean) and because those that did, received lower returns than
their male counterparts (coefficient). This occurred both within
and between employers.
Discrimination estimates were calculated in ratio form for
Models 1 to 4 and are presented in the lower portions o.f Table 3.
The raw difference of $4,396 (presented in Table 1) between
female and male college graduates resulted in an unadjusted
female-male earnings ratio of .833. Adjusted ratios, which
represent the ratio of women's salaries to men's salaries holding
endowments (mean) constant, are calculated in two forms, "Ar" and
"I-Ratio" column indicates the portion of the earnings difference
17
that is due to differential returns for the same endowments, and
thus, is considered to be an estimate of discrimination.
In particular, according to the adjusted ratio (Ar), women
received 15 and 5 cents less per dollar than men after
controlling for human capital factors and major in Models 1 and
2, respectively. The addition of the industry variables in Model
3, Table 3, increased the adjusted ratio (Ar) to .968, with a
corresponding unexplained portion of .032. similarly,
controlling for employer brought the adjusted ratio (Ar) to .965.
To the extent that the employer or industry in which graduates
seek employment exhibit characteristics such as barriers to entry
that are endogenous to labor market discrimination, Models 3 and
4 will underestimate discrimination.4
Research Question Two
How much of the female-male disparity in the starting
salaries occurs within versus between organizations? Table 4
presents estimates of between- and within- organization
differences, based on single equation ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions that pool data on women and men.
Four sets of regressions were run for each of three general
Models A, B, and C, in which subsequent variables were added to
each model. From the resulting twelve regressions, changes in
the gender dummy coefficients could be calculated for purposes of
estimating between- and within-employer pay differences. For
example, in Table 4, Model B, star~ing salary was regressed on
18
industry dummy variables attributed 67% to such sources. Given
~
the gender dummy variable, degree level, GPA, and controls for
year of graduation and ethnicity. The resulting coefficient on
gender was -.15, or -15%, which says that women received 15%
($3,663) less in pay than men. To determine how much of this 15%
occurred within versus between employers, a second regression
added the employer dummy variables, and a new gender coefficient
of -.04, or -4% ($977) was estimated. This represents the
difference occurring within organizations. The difference
between the -15% and the -4%, or -11% ($2,686), represents the
between-employer portion of the pay difference. Between- and
within- industry differences are revealed by the addition of the
industry dummy variables to Models A, B, and C.
The figures in Table 4 are also expressed as a percentage of
the total difference for a particular model. Thus, for Model B,
of the unaccounted difference of 15%, 73% (.11/.15) occurred
between employers; 27% (.04/.15) occurred within employers.
---------------------------
Insert Table 4 about here
---------------------------
A key finding is that in all models, the employer dummy
variables attributed less of the female-male differences to
within-organization sources than did industry variables. .For
example, in Model C the employer dummy variables attributed 50%
of the remaining gap to within-employer differences, while the
that the employer variables explained more of the variance in
starting salaries in Models A, B, and C, and that the use of
19
industry variables with employer (employer/industry) added little
to the adjusted R-squared values, it is clear as well that
employer data more accurately distinguished within- and between-
employer pay differences than did industry data. This is very
significant for policy discussions regarding gender-related pay
differences because differential results from using employer
instead of industry measures could lead to dissimilar policy
conclusions.
Another key finding is that women and men work for different
employers, largely on the basis of college major. Before major
is controlled for in Model B, 73% of the initial salary
difference was due to segregation by organization, or between-
employer differences. However, when department major was added
in Model C, between-employer sources accounted for only 50% of
the remaining pay difference. In other words, a large portion of
the between-organization difference originated from women and men
possessing different majors. Once major is controlled for in
Model C, the within- and between- organization sources became
more equivalent.
Although between-employer pay differences are larger than
those within organizations, the long-run effects of salary gaps
within organizations were substantial. For instance, in Model C
the within-employer starting salary disadvantage of $732
translated into a present ~alue $27,864 shortfall for women over
a 30-year career and $7,600 for a la-year career, assuming a 7%
20
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annual salary growth ~ate and 5% discount rate (e.g., Gerhart &
Rynes, 1991).5
Research Question Three
What are the implications of these results regarding the
ability of public policies to remedy differences between female
and male starting salaries?
The results presented in Table 4 suggest that a policy which
focuses on each organization separately (e.g., pay equity) could
impact between $732 (16%) and $1,221 (28%) of the total $4,396
female-male salary gap. The $732 represents the within-
organization pay differences remaining after human capital,
major, and control variables were measured; the $1,221 represents
the entire within-employer pay difference between women and men.
More specifically, with the human capital variables of
degree level and GPA added to the model, the female-male earnings
difference fell to 15%, of which 27%, or $977, occurred within
employers. Adding college major decreased the gender difference
to 6%, of which half, or $732, occurred within employers.
However, since pay equity policies often seek to reduce the
portion of the gap stemming from women and men being concentrated
in different fields, perhaps the potential of pay equity is
underestimated by controlling for major.
It is possible that equal pay polici.es could address this
$732 - $1,221 gap as well; however, as successive control
variables, such as degree level and college major, were added to
the model, it is less likely that new hires would be performing
substantially the same work. Additionally, there is evidence
that the portion of the pay gap that could be remedied by equal
pay policies is relatively small (Buckley, 1971; Groshen, 1990),
but not in all cases (Gerhart, 1990).
Although we found substantial within-employer differences,
our results suggested that the largest portion (72%) of pay
differences between women and men occurred because they work for
different employers. Therefore, policies such as pay equity that
focus only on within-employer differences would not address this
portion of the earnings gap. Equal employment opportunity
efforts and affirmative action have the potential to affect the
entire earnings difference, by addressing both job assignment and
hiring practices. Equal education efforts could address the
portion of the earnings difference due to different majors or
levels of education.
DISCUSSION
This study augments the literature on female-male pay
differences in two key ways. First, the study finds that even
with equivalent college majors, degree level, quality of
education, and perhaps most interesting, the same employer, women
and men do not earn equivalent starting salaries. Second, in
addition to providing new evidence regarding the size of between-
versus within-employer pay differences, the study provides unique
evidence that employer data more accurately distinguish within-
employer pay differences than do industry data. Further, the
employer-based estimates suggest a smaller role for within-
22
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and adjusted ratios of female to male salaries. Our unadjusted
~.-
employer policies (e.g., pay equity) than do industry-based
estimates, confirming the speculation of J&S.
The first research question of the study required
examination of unexplained earnings differences, or
discrimination estimates, which were calculated using unadjusted
ratio of .833 is significantly higher than the .66 estimated by
the Bureau of the Census for white collar professionals in 1988,
the most recent year in this data set. In addition, both the
adjusted and unadjusted ratios are among the highest in the
literature (cain, 1986), suggesting little labor market
discrimination. On the other hand, as stated earlier, given the
extensive control variables, the more remarkable result may be
that the ratios do not reach unity. Also, because workers
graduated from a prestigious, or "brand name", university,
employers received "guarantees" regarding the expected quality of
graduates, which should lead to less variation in salaries
(Akerlof, 1970).
Supply-side variables accounted for over half of the
differential in starting salaries in this study, which is
considered to be an upper bound for such measures (Cain, ~986i
Treiman & Hartmann, 1981), although analyses which include the
important variable of college major will account for more of the
differential (Goldin, 1990). Indeed our second set of analyses
showed that the inclusion of human capital (qualifications)
variables in the analyses, especially college major, accounted
23
for much of the earnings gap in this sample, and resulted in
much better fitting models (Tables 2 and 4). This suggests that
studies such as J&S's (1986) and Groshen's (1990) may have found
different results if more precise human capital measures had been
included.
Despite the completeness of the model in the first set of
analyses, caution should be used in interpreting unexplained
female-male earnings, and/or attributing differences to
discrimination. Generally, the more completely specified the
model, the lower the estimate of discrimination (Cain, 1986).
But there is a tradeoff to consider between the completeness of
the model and using variables endogenous to discrimination. For
example, the addition of the variable department major to models
in this study improves their explanatory power, but to the extent
that department major is influenced by the feedback effects of
discriminatory employers, then inclusion of this variable will
also control for, and hence, underestimate discrimination. To
the extent that department major captures legitimate labor market
factors, exclusion of this variable will lead to an overestimate
of discrimination. And if there are omitted variables in the
form of unmeasured productivity characteristics, discrimination
may be under- or over-estimated depending upon which gender
possesses more of the omitted characteristics (Cain, 1986).
Also, caution should be used in the interpretation of the
intercepts in decompositions (Jones, 1983).
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The findings from the second analyses (Research Question
Two) provide new information to help reconcile inconsistencies on
the size of within- versus between- employer pay differences and
reinforce the importance of organization-level data in studying
pay determination (Blau, 1977; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Johnson
& Solon, 1986). The results indicate that the overall between-
employer differences typically exceed within-employer
differences. This finding contradicts Groshen (1990) who found
larger within-employer pay differences, and is consistent with
literature that finds larger between-employer differences (Blau,
1977; Buckley 1971) and larger betweeen-industry differences
(Johnson & Solon, 1986). As one would expect, the results also
indicate that employer data more accurately distinguish between
inter- and intra-employer pay differences than do industry data,
which underscores the importance of using organization-level data
in studying gender-related earnings and in drawing implications
from such studies.
The findings have important implications for employers.
Within-employer pay differences between women and men may stern
from employers providing less favorable ratings for female
qualifications as compared to male qualifications, particularly
when much inference about abilities is required (Nieva & Gutek,
1980). As such, employers may want to obtain more information on
applicants in order to lessen the amount of inference required,
and to standardize and monitor their recruiting and hiring
practices (Powell, 1993) to prevent disparate starting salary
outcomes for women. Between-employer pay differences could be
ameliorated by improving employer effectiveness at attracting
applicants, regardless of gender (Powell, 1993), and by efforts
to counter preferences for men in hiring decisions (Olian, et
al., 1990), especially in traditionally male-dominated employers
and industries.
The findings may have important implications for public
policy and in particular, pay equity. Pay equity, or equal pay
for work of equal value, represents another option for employers
and policymakers concerned about the within-organization pay
difference between women and men. There is evidence that some
major companies may be implementing various forms of pay equity
on their own and that the Clinton Administration may re-open it
as a public policy issue (Bureau of National Affairs, 1993). In
addition, the policy is widespread among public sector employers,
particularly at the state level, and it is mandated for public
and private employers in Ontario, Canada.
Our results indicate that pay equity could remedy between
$732 (16%) and $1,221 (28%) of the $4,396 overall starting pay
difference. This finding is consistent with other research on
oomparable worth. In a review of nine studies on female-male
earnings differences, Ehrenberg (1989) concluded that comparable
worth policies would address from 10% to 20% of the wage gap for
public sector employees, with small employment decreases. Blau
and Kahn (1993), in an international study of the gender earnings
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targeted policies to address these differences. The substantial
~.-
gap, also concluded that a comparable worth policy would lead to
a significant reduction in the pay gap in the United states.
However, pay equity may have detrimental or unintended
consequences. Using longitudinal data, Gerhart and EI Cheikh
(1991) found that women with intermittent work patterns would
benefit the most from a comparable worth policy, while Smith
(1988) found that highly paid women and/or those working for
larger employers would fare better. Also, there may be second-
round effects (Blau & Kahn, 1993; Ehrenberg 1989; J&S, 1986) such
as unemploYment.
The fact that starting salary differences between women and
men are due to a variety of factors and occur within and between
employers suggests the need for an integrated approach of
differences in college major could be remedied by proactive equal
education efforts, and the elimination of feedback effects of
existing employer discrimination. stronger equal opportunity and
affirmative action efforts may address the difference of $732 to
$1,221 occurring within employers, or the $733 to $3,175 between-
employer difference, but existing policies did not prevent the
significant pay difference in our sample. Thus, equal
opportunity and affirmative action efforts may not be functioning
as intended.
The analysis of public policies would not be complete
without consideration of contextual factors which impact their
effectiveness, such as the methods of implementation and
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budgetary constraints. Also, the intended effects of policies
may be stymied by competing constituencies (Acker, 1989).
CONCLUSION
This study examined the starting salaries of college
graduates, and specifically, female-male pay differences. The
use of human capital controls not found in other studies
indicated that most of the pay differences between women and men
were due to differences in mean levels of endowments,
particularly college major, rather than coefficients, or pay for
the endowments. still, despite these controls, women earned less
than men even when working for the same employer, although
overall, the largest portion of the female-male pay difference
occurred between organizations.
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slightly higher average experience levels than men. As such,
I
ENDNOTES
1. We considered performing a formal correction for
selection bias (Heckman, 1990), but some evidence suggests that
the estimates obtained with such "corrections" may be no better
and sometimes worse than the "uncorrected" estimates (Stolzenberg
& RelIes, 1990).
2. Olson, Frieze, & Good (1987) found that their 4
experience measures were significant in explaining the variation
in the salaries of MBA graduates. In this sample, only
observations from 1985 had age data with which an experience
proxy could be calculated with the formula: age - years of.
schooling - 6. More than 70% of the 1985 graduates had no
experience using this measure, and both women and men had an
average experience level of less than one year, ranging up to 19
years of experience for women and up to 17 years of experience
for men. Gerhart & Rynes (1991) in their sample of MBAs from the
same academic institution as this study found that women had
there may be little gender difference in experience in the
sample, and thus, the lack of an experience measure may matter
little in these analyses.
3. We do not control for ethnicity in these equations
because ethnicity would contribute to the "endowment" portion of
the decomposition, and only variables which are considered to be
legitimate bases upon which employers can offer remuneration
should be included as endowments. For comparison purposes, we
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ran these equations and performed salary decompositions
controlling for the ethnicity of the graduates. We found that
the contribution of ethnicity to starting salary differences was
small, and its inclusion did not appreciably change the overall
decomposition results.
4. It could be argued that if women and men face different
labor markets, their data should be analyzed separately. Chow
test results indicated th~t data on women and men could be pooled
for Models 1 and 2, but for Models 3 and 4 the tests indicated
that the intercepts and coefficients may be sUfficiently
different to warrant separate equations. Hence, we have analyzed
the data in separate (Research Question One) and pooled (Research
Question Two) models.
5. It should be noted that results from Research Questions
One and Two are related, and indeed, similar models yield similar
results. For instance, Model 2 from the first analysis and Model
C of the second analysis are identical except for gender and
ethnic dummy variables in the latter. Thus, the discrimination
estimate of .05 from the salary decomposition of Model 2, Table
3, is close to the unexplained gender dummy variable of .06 of
Model C, Table 4. This .06 represents 33% of the earnings
difference between women and men, which corresponds to the total
"coefficient" of 31% for Model 2, Table 3.
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TABLE 1
Descr1pt1ve Informat10n on Sample
VARIABLE
AVG. STARTING SALARY:
LOG
(std. deviation)
$ (converted log)
PAY DIFFERENCE
AVERAGE GPA 0 - 4.3
(std. deviation)
DEGREE LEVEL
(% of gender)
BACHELORS
KASTERS
ETHNIC (% of gender)
ASIAN
BLACK
HISPANIC
WHITE
OTHER/HISSING
KAJORS OF HIGHEST
FREQUENCIES
(% of major)
A) ELECTRICAL
ENGINEERING
B) HOTEL ADHIN.
C) APPLIED ECONOMICS
& BUSINESS HGHT
E) INDUSTRIAL &
LABOR RELATIONS
HOST FREQUENT
INDUSTRIES
(% of industry)
A) HOTELS & HOTELS
B) BANKING
C) COLLEGES &
UNIVERSITIES
E) ELECTRONIC
COHPUTING EQUIP.
FEMALE
(N=1,289)
9.994
(
. 318)
$21,885
-$4,396
3.00
(.381)
1,127 (87%)
162 (13%)
118
49
36
1,053
33
(9%)
(4%)
(3%)
(82%)
(2%)
85 (21%)
182 (56%)
133 (49%)
100 (52%)
135 (60%)
126 (58%)
131 (61%)
52 (27%)
34
KALE
(N=1,511)
10.177
(.295)
$26,281
$0
2.96
.(
. 4 05 )
1,149 (76%)
362 (24%)
134
54
56
1,222
45
(9%)
(4%)
(4%)
(80%)
(3%)
327 (79%)
144 (44%)
136 (51%)
93 (48%)
89 (40%)
91 (42%)
85 (39%)
141 (73%)
TOTAL/
OVERALL
10.09
(
.319 )
$24,101
-$4,396
2.98
(.395)
2,276
524
252
103
92
2275
78
412
326
269
193
224
217
216
193
MODEL 1 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 2
VARIABLE WOMEN MEN WOMEN MEN
INTERCEPT 10.27*** 10.42*** 10.07*** 10.15***
(.039) (.028) (.072) (.197)
DEGREE
-.215*** -.281*** -.183*** -.171***
LEVEL: BACHELORS (. 026) (.017) ( . 021) (.015)
GPA: HIGH .036 .103*** .048A .049*
(.033) ( . 025) ( . 025) (.019)
MEDIUM -.006 .018 .008 .012
(
. 026) ( . 020) ( . 020) (.015)
GRADUATION
DATE: 85
-.160*** -.114*** -.133*** -.121***
(.024) ( . 020) (.018) (.015)
86
-.119***
-.090*** -.093*** -.077***
(
. 024) ( . 019) (.018) ( . 015)
87
-.077** -.040* -.069*** -.040**
(
. 024) (.020) (.018) (.015)
DEPARTMENT MAJOR NO NO YES YES
INDUSTRY NO NO NO NO
EMPLOYER NO NO NO NO
ADJ. R-SQUARED .078 .180 .511 .557
SAMPLE SIZE 1,289 1,511 1,289 1,511
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TABLE 2
Regression Results From starting Salary Equations8
A P < .10
* P < .05
** P < .01
*** P < .001
8 Figures in table corresponding to the intercept, degree
level, grade point average, and date of graduation represent
coefficients and (standard errors) from OLS regressions.
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Regression Results FrQm starting Salary Equations.
VARIABLE
INTERCEPT
DEGREE
LEVEL: BACHELORS
GPA: HIGH
MEDIUM
GRADUATION
DATE: 85
86
87
DEPARTMENT MAJOR
INDUSTRY
EMPLOYER
ADJ. R-SQUARED
SAMPLE SIZE
*
p < .05
** P < .01
*** P < .001
MODEL 3
WOMEN
10.44***
(.143)
-.192***
(.017)
.043*
(.020)
.020
(.015)
-.146***
(.014)
-.102***
(.014)
-.068***
(.014)
YES
YES
:NO
.716
1,289
MODEL 3
MEN
10.38***
(.213)
-.180***
(.013)
.035*
(.017)
.009
(.013)
-.107***
(.013)
-.075***
(.013)
-.036**
(
. 013)
YES
YES
NO
.686
1,511
MODEL 4
WOMEN
10.30***
(.102)
-.201***
(
. 017)
.032
(
. 019)
.008
(.015)
-.164***(.015)
-.096***
(.014)
-.072***(.014)
YES
NO
YES
.786
1,289
MODEL 4
MEN
10.44***
(.171)
-.lE8***
(
. 012 )
.009
(.016)
-.008
(.013)
-.112***
(
. 012 )
-.080***
(
. 012 )
-.048***
(.012)
YES
NO
YES
.768
1,511
a
Figures in table corresponding to the intercept, degree
level, grade point average, and date of graduation represent
coefficients and (standard errors) from OLS regressions.
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TABLE 3
Salary Decomposition Results
MODEL 1 MODEL 2
AMOUNT
ATTRIBU-
TABLE TO . . .
COEFFI- COEFFI-
MEAN CIENT MEAN CIENT
VARIABLES (X) (B) TOTAL (X) (B) TOTAL
INTERCEPT .000 .839 .839 .000 .461 .461
LEVEL .175 -.314 -.139 .107 .055 .162
GPA .172 .829 1.001 -.001 .018 .017
GRADDATE -.003 .154 .151 -.003 .077 .074
MAJOR .588 -.304 .284
TOTAL .172 .829 1.00 .690 .307 1.00
CALCULATION OF MODEL 1 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 2
EARNINGS RATIOS'
DISCRIMINATION DISCRI- DISCRI-
ESTIMATES: EARNINGS MINATION EARNINGS MINATION
RATIO ESTIMATE RATIO ESTIMATE
UNADJUSTED (Ur)a .833 .167 .833 .167
ADJUSTED (Ar)b .853 .147 .954 .046
ADJUSTED' (Ar') C .859 .141 .945 .055
~ADJUSTED RATIO = AVG. FEMALE SALARY/AVG. MALE SALARY
----.-.---
bADJUSTED RATIO
cADJUSTED' RATIO
=
SUM (FEMALE B*MALE X) /AVG. MALE SALARY
=
AVG. FEMALE SALARY/SUM(MALE B*FEMALE X)
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
salary Decomposition Results
HODEL
3
AMOUNT
ATTRIBU-
TABLE TO . . .
VARIABLES
HEAN
(X)
INTERCEPT .000
LEVEL .112
GPA -.001
GRADDATE -.003
MAJOR .232
INDUSTRY .385
EMPLOYER
TOTAL .727
CALCULATION OF
EARNINGS RATIOS
-'
ESTIMATES OF
UNEXPLAINED
DIFFERENCES:
UNADJUSTED (ur)8
ADJUSTED (Ar)b
ADJUSTED' (Ar')c
HODEL
4
COEFFI-
CIENT
(B) TOTAL
-.340
.053
-.050
.132
-1.055
1. 539
.279
HODEL 3
HEAN
(X)
COEFFI-
CIENT
(B) TOTAL
-.340 .000 .762.762
.165 .160.104 .264
-.051 .002 -.080 -.078
.129 -.003 .122 .119
-.823 .207 -.554 -.347
1.924
.351 -.083 .268
1.00
HODEL 3
.662 .327 1.00
HODEL 4 HODEL 4
PORTION PORTION
EARNINGS NOT EARNINGS NOT
RATIO EXPLAINED RATIO EXPLAINED
.833
.968
.951
.167 .833 .167
.032 .965 .035
.049 .942 .058
~ADJUSTED RATIO = AVG. FEMALE SALARY/AVG. HALE SALARY
bADJUSTED RATIO
cADJUSTED' RATIO
= SUM (FEMALE B*HALE X)/AVG. HALE SALARY
= AVG. FEMALE SALARY/SUH(HALE B*FEMALE X)
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Between- Versus Within- Differences
TOTAL
SALARY
DIFFERENCE
%
($)
% OF TOTAL
-18%
($4,396)
100%
BETWEEN
EMPLOYERS
%
($)
% OF
TOTAL
WITHIN
EMPLOYERS
%
($)
% OF TOTAL
ADJ.
R-2
.112
MODEL 8
A)LN(SAL.)=SEX +
ETHNIC + DATE
OF GRADUATION
-13%
($3,175)
72%
-5%
($1,221)
28%
+ EMPLOYER .717
-12%
($2,931)
67%
-6%
($1,465)
33%
+ INDUSTRY .637
-13%
($3,175)
72%
-5%
($1,221)
28%
+ EMPLOYER/
INDUSTRY
B) MODEL A +
DEGREE LEVEL
+ GPA
.722
-15%
($3,663)
100%
.205
-11%
($2,686)
73%
-4%
($977)
27%
+ EMPLOYER .759
-10%
($2,442)
67%
-5%
($1,221)
33%
+ INDUSTRY .682
-11%
($2,686)
73%
-4%
($977)
27%
+ EMPLOYER/
INDUSTRY
C) MODEL B +
MAJOR
.763
-6%
($1,465)
100%
.569
-3%
($733)
50%
+ EMPLOYER .785 -3%
($732)
50%
+ INDUSTRY .722 -2%
($488)
33%
-4%
($977)
67%
+ EMPLOYER/
INDUSTRY
-3% -3%
($733) ($733)
50% 50%
within Models A, B, and C correspond to
- (12) in text.
.788
Regressions
equations (9)
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